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Section 1.  Introduction 
 
Economists have written extensively about market approaches to environmental 
externalities including emissions taxes and permit trading programs.  Coase (1960), Dales 
(1968), Montgomery (1972), Tietenberg (1985), and Baumol and Oates (1988), for 
instance, provide arguments for such approaches.  Relative to rigid regulatory approaches 
such as technology mandates, market approaches allow individual firms to determine 
their own abatement strategies.   When marginal abatement costs vary across firms, the 
flexibility of a permit trading program leads to cost savings over technology mandates. 
Moreover, in principle, permit trading minimizes the total abatement cost of achieving a 
specified emissions target.  A permit trading program has the added bonus of prompting 
new competition among previously independent abatement technology industries 
resulting in subsequent reductions in abatement costs (Rezek and Blair, 2005).1     
The promise of achieving low cost greenhouse gas abatement has brought the 
concept of carbon dioxide (CO2) permit trading to the forefront of international 
discussions on climate change.  Recent proposals for greenhouse gas allowance trading 
programs include those in Europe, a small number of U.S. states, and voluntary corporate 
programs.  The perceived success of the U.S. market for sulfur dioxide (SO2) and 
nitrogen oxide (NOx) in the electric utility industry, established under Title IV of the 
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, has both motivated and heavily influenced the design 
of proposed CO2 trading programs. 
To be sure, climate change is a real concern of the international community.  The 
Kyoto Protocol serves as the key international policy instrument to reduce greenhouse 
gases.  Under the agreement, which was negotiated in December 1997 and became 
                                                 
1 For more on the economics of permit trading, please see Section 2 A. 
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effective on February 16, 2005 following ratification by Russia in November 2004, 
collective emissions are to be reduced to 5.2 percent below 1990 levels between 2008 and 
2012.  Country-specific targets range from 8 percent in the European Union and 7 percent 
in the U.S. to 0 percent in Russia.  If greenhouse gas emissions increase or reductions fail 
to meet targets, countries may participate in a permit trading market.  In all, 163 countries 
have ratified the protocol, though notable exceptions include the U.S. and Australia.  In 
addition to the Kyoto Protocol, in June 2005 the science academies of 11 countries, 
including the U.S., Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, 
and the United Kingdom, issued a joint statement on global climate change.  The 
statement warns that climate change is real and that human activity is the driving force 
behind recent changes in the Earth’s climate (EIA 2005).   
Carbon is an element commonly found in vast quantities in the atmosphere, soil, 
carbonate rocks such as limestone, and dissolved ocean water.  Records from Antarctic 
ice cores reveal that the “carbon cycle” has been imbalanced for some 200 years, with a 
surplus of carbon accumulating in the atmosphere faster than the natural environment can 
sequester it.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that before 1750 
atmospheric carbon concentration rested at 280 ± 10 parts per million.  Today 
concentration levels are at 374.9 parts per million (IPCC 2001).   
The U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) estimates that U.S. energy-related 
carbon dioxide emissions in 2002 totaled 5,746 million metric tons (MMT), or about 24 
percent of the world total.  In 2000 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
estimates that energy-related activities accounted for 85 percent of U.S. total 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions on a carbon equivalent basis, and was 
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specifically responsible for 97 percent of CO2 emissions (EPA 2002).  Moreover, the 
EPA found that electric utility industry fossil fuel combustion accounted for 39 percent of 
national anthropogenic CO2 emissions in 2000, consuming 34 percent of U.S. energy 
from fossil fuels and making the electric utility industry the largest economic sector 
producing CO2 emissions (EPA 2001, 2005).  In addition, the EPA reports that CO2 from 
fossil fuel combustion accounted for a nearly constant 79 percent of global warming 
potential (GWP) weighted emissions from 1990 to 2000, making it the single largest 
source of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.  Overall, approximately 85 percent of energy 
consumed in the U.S. is produced from fossil fuels (EPA 2001).   
Given that the electric utility industry is responsible for the largest portion of 
domestic greenhouse gas emissions, that CO2 represents a dominant share of these 
emissions, and that economic theory suggests a tradable permit approach minimizes 
aggregate abatement costs, a national CO2 tradable permit market for emissions from 
electric utility plants offers a legitimate policy option for curbing carbon emissions in the 
U.S.  This paper endeavors to shed light on how a tradable CO2 permit market might take 
shape by analyzing plant-level marginal abatement costs.  Specifically, the “shadow 
price” for a ton of CO2 is identified through a linear programming model, where the 
shadow price represents the opportunity cost of abatement (in terms of lost revenue) and 
therefore serves as a proxy for marginal abatement cost.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
economic rationale of trading programs and outlines existing allowance trading programs 
including the Acid Rain Reduction program developed under the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, as well as various CO2 programs in Europe and the United States.  Section 
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2 also reviews approaches for estimating shadow prices.  Section 3 presents the model 
used to identify CO2 shadow prices in this paper.  Section 4 describes the data and 
procedure used to calculate shadow prices.  Section 5 provides the results and 





Section 2.  Prior Research on Allowance Trading Programs and Shadow Prices  
 
2.1 Utilizing a Property Rights Approach to Curb Externalities: Increasing Economic 
Efficiency through Permit Trading 
Traditionally, government regulation targeting pollution has sought to uniformly 
control emissions among polluters.  This approach, known as “command and control” 
(CAC), ultimately imposes a “one-size fits all” set of rules on emissions sources, though 
these rules may take on any number of forms.  For instance, a regulation may impose a 
uniform standard of emissions per kilowatt hour at electric utility plants, or it may require 
the use of a particular abatement technology such as a scrubber on a smokestack.  A 
major criticism of the CAC approach is that a uniform standard is too rigid and may not 
represent the least cost abatement strategy for the firm, resulting in a potential efficiency 
loss given the set of abatement opportunities that could otherwise be pursued.  To achieve 
overall minimum abatement costs, each firm must abate to the point where marginal 
abatement costs are equalized across firms.  As a result, rigid technology standards 
potentially engender an inefficient abatement scheme by forcing the adoption of a 
technology with varying levels of implementation costs between firms.  Thus, marginal 
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abatement costs may differ for each firm, meaning that overall costs have not been 
minimized.  This leads to a loss of economic efficiency, as the prescribed quantity of 
emissions could be reduced at a lower cost through each firm utilizing its own most 
efficient abatement option.    
The concept of permit trading emerged as an alternative to CAC in the early 
1970s (Stavins 2003).  Under a permit trading scheme, the regulator selects an aggregate 
emissions target, and a number of permits equal to targeted emissions are distributed to 
polluting firms covered by the program.  These permits may then be traded between 
firms, as firms with higher marginal abatement costs will find it beneficial to purchase 
permits from firms with lower marginal abatement costs.  Stavins writes that, in theory, if 
properly designed and implemented, market-based instruments allow any desired level of 
pollution cleanup to be realized at the lowest overall cost to society, by providing 
incentives for the greatest reductions in pollution by those firms that can achieve the 
reductions most cheaply.  That is, firms that can reduce pollution cheaply are willing and 
able to sell excess permits to those firms facing steeper marginal abatement costs.  
Furthermore, this market flexibility ultimately results in aggregate abatement being 
achieved at lowest overall cost.  That is, the initial reduction of emissions is shifted from 
all firms—including firms with high abatement costs—to firms with low marginal 
abatement costs, reducing the overall cost of reducing emissions.  Figure 1 below 





Figure 1.  Firm Level Equilibrium of Marginal Abatement Cost and Permits2
 
 On the X-axis is the level of emissions for a firm and the number of permits 
owned by the firm.  On the Y-axis is the marginal abatement cost for reducing emissions 
by one unit at the given level of emissions as well as the market price for permits.  In the 
region to the right of E0 MAC is less than p0, the permit market price.  As a result, it is 
cheaper for the firm to reduce emissions rather than purchase a permit for each unit of 
emissions in excess of E0.  However, in the region to the left of E0 MAC is greater than 
p0.  Consequently, it is cheaper for the firm to purchase a permit for each unit of 
emissions below E0 rather than reduce emissions further.  Thus, the firm will emit E0 
units of emissions, is the point where p0 equals MAC.  Accordingly, the firm will 
purchase q0 permits and will always end up emitting at E0 regardless of the initial permit 
endowment. 
 This approach allows each individual firm to pursue its own least-cost strategy for 
reducing emissions.  Note that a CAC approach could match the cost savings of a permit 
                                                 
2 John Stranlund.  Course Lecture Notes.  “Natural Resource and Environmental Economics.”  University 
of Massachusetts.  Spring 2006.  Available online at: 
http://courses.umass.edu/resec262/documents/262Lecture13TransferableDischargePermits.pdf.   
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market if MAC for all firms could be made equal, but this requires that the standards for 
each firm be unique to that firm, implying prohibitively high administrative costs.  
Moreover, a tradable permit program naturally achieves cost-effectiveness since each 
firm emits at p0 = MAC.  As a result, each firm is operating with the same MAC.   In 
addition, a permit trading scheme remains cost-effective over time as conditions within 
the industry change, the number of permits is reduced, inflation changes money value, 
and technological innovations reduce abatement costs.  Because firms will always emit 
where p0 = MAC, a cost-effective result is always achieved.  For this reason, a permit 
trading program may be preferable to an emissions tax in that the permit trading program 
naturally adapts to changing conditions while an emissions tax would have to be 
continually adjusted by policymakers.  Indeed, Weitzman (1974) notes that under 
uncertainty the distinction between a quantity-based approach (permit market) and a 
price-based approach (tax) is irrelevant in “an infinitely flexible control environment 
where the planners can continually adjust instruments to reflect current understanding of 
a fluid situation and producers instantaneously respond…”  In such a case he writes that 
the determination of the approach should be left up to other factors.  To be sure, these 
other factors would likely include the administrative and compliance costs of continually 
adjusting the price of carbon to meet a quantity target, which, given the Kyoto model, is a 
likely scenario even if the eventual U.S. target is not as significant as it would be under 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Thus, a permit market regulated by a naturally adjusting price 
appears superior to a CO2 tax. 
 Because the U.S. electric utility industry is responsible for 39 percent of national 
anthropogenic CO2 emission, a CO2 permit trading scheme offers a cost-effective 
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approach to reduce a lion’s share of domestic CO2 anthropogenic emissions.  A number 
of studies have examined the success of the SO2 trading scheme set up under the 1990 
Clean Air Act Amendments.  This paper extends much of this analysis to CO2, seeking to 
calculate a shadow price proxy for CO2 abatement costs at the plant level.  The shadow 
price then enables a picture to develop of how different types of utilities would behave in 
a CO2 permit market, total costs associated with reducing aggregate emissions to given 
levels, and an analysis of whether a role exists for alternative fuels to play in reaching an 
abatement target.   
 
2.1  Acid Rain Program as a Model for CO2 Trading 
The success of the Acid Rain Program under the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments has led to global interest in tradable emissions permits to curb greenhouse 
gases.  Kruger (2005) notes that private companies have begun setting voluntary CO2 
emissions targets, some of which are designed to influence a national program.  Nine 
Mid-Atlantic and New England states have also developed a regional allowance trading 
program, hoping to influence the design of a national trading program.  In addition, the 
European Union (EU) has implemented the largest greenhouse gas allowance trading 
program to date.  Kruger adds that as the “first mover,” the EU program could have 
enormous influence on any international or domestic program.   
 The extensive literature examining the U.S. SO2 program has important 
implications for the design of a CO2 trading program.  Ellerman et al. (2000) report on 
the history of trading programs, specifically the SO2 Acid Rain Program.  While their 
analysis focuses on the SO2 trading program they mention that emissions trading 
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programs may work well for other types of emissions such as CO2.  Carlson et al. (2000) 
compare the SO2 trading program to a uniform emission rate standard among electricity 
generating units.  Their estimates suggest that, with the trading program, the electric 
utility industry may ultimately save $700-$800 million (1995 dollars) per year in 
abatement costs.  However, retrospective analysis suggests that the gains from trade in 
the first two years of the program were largely unrealized.  They postulate that realized 
gains from trade were lower than predicted for two main reasons.  First, the price of low-
sulfur coal was lower during the first years of the market than anticipated.  This may be 
because energy prices were also lower, reducing the cost of transporting coal and 
effectively making it cheaper.  Second, improvements in technology lowered the cost of 
fuel switching.  As a result, plants were able to rely more significantly on lower sulfur 
coal than in recent years without any substantial equipment modifications, and other 
plants willing to invest in new technology were able to more cheaply switch to lower SO2 
emitting fuels such as natural gas.  The authors note that fuel switching served as a major 
abatement strategy for SO2 and suggest that it may serve to inform any potential CO2 
abatement program.   
 Stavins (1998) states that the Acid Rain Program was so successful in reducing 
emissions that after the first two years of implementation participating utilities had 
“banked” more than six million tons.  That is, emission levels fell well below set targets, 
and these allowances could be saved for later use.  Because the program allows for 
banking, however, many of these permits may be utilized at some point in the future, 
which will effectively reduce the long-term benefits that appear to have been realized in 
the early years of the program.  Additionally, a large number of permit purchasers could 
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turn out to be speculators buying permits at low prices to sell once regulators tighten 
emission targets.  Stavins arrives at a somewhat different conclusion than Carlson et al. 
(2000), writing, “Prospective analysis in 1990 suggested that the program's benefits 
would approximately equal its costs (Portney, 1990), but recent analysis indicates that 
benefits will exceed costs by a very significant margin (Burtraw, Krupnick, Mansur, 
Austin and Farell, 1997).”  Stavins also considers the political economy of the SO2 
trading program, noting that it is the first break from the traditional command-and-control 
strategies of previous environmental regulatory regimes.  Stavins outlines a general 
paradigm shift in the late 1980s of the political center, which now had a more favorable 
view of market solutions to social problems.  With the option of an emissions tax or a 
tradable permit approach, environmental economists preferred the latter, as a tax makes 
the costs of environmental compliance more visible to consumers, legislators, and firms.  
Particularly if permits are given away for free, firms are better off with a permit system 
than an emissions tax.   
 While the U.S. experience with SO2 trading yields relevant insights for the design 
of a CO2 trading market, there are important differences between a market for SO2 
emissions and CO2 emissions.  Kruger (2005) summarizes the main findings of the 
current literature comparing the two markets.  Kruger recommends that many features of 
the Acid Rain Program, such as banking of excess emissions reductions over time and 
strong monitoring and enforcement provisions, should be included in any CO2 trading 
program.  However, Kruger also suggests some key modifications for a CO2 trading 
program.  For instance, SO2 is emitted primarily by coal-fired power plants.  Sources of 
CO2 emissions are diverse, consisting of anything that burns a fossil fuel.  Kruger argues 
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that instead of trying to regulate each smokestack, an ideal program would cover the 
entire economy, possibly even regulating producers and refiners of fuels.  Including 
emissions from the transportation sector (affecting mobile sources) would also be 
preferable and could be made possible by including refineries in the trading program 
through the quality of fuel they produce. 
 Kruger continues, stating that most permits in the SO2 program are allocated free 
of charge to utility plants.  Under a CO2 program, he suggests that permits might be 
auctioned to the highest bidder.  Because the total value of the permits would be higher in 
a CO2 program, this would make it possible to redistribute revenues from the auction or 
allocate some allowances to energy consumers.  Moreover, Kruger finds that a CO2 
program should consider stabilizing allowance prices.  This might entail a price ceiling 
for permits, where the regulator would issue as many permits as the industry wishes to 
purchase at a given price.  This may be necessary considering many scholars believe that 
CO2 prices will be more unpredictable than SO2 prices, and may be caused by the 
relatively small number of mitigation options for CO2 and lack of cost-effective post-
combustion controls.  As long as the long-term trajectory of CO2 emissions is negative, 
Kruger notes that a temporary increase in CO2 emissions is not of serious concern to most 
scholars.    
  
2.3  Predicted CO2 Permit Prices in the U.S. and Other Regions 
 A handful of studies have estimated CO2 marginal abatement costs for electric 
power plants and/or estimated CO2 permit prices under a global or regional market.  The 
EIA International Energy Outlook 2005 estimates marginal abatement costs per metric 
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ton for Canada, Japan, and Western Europe for varying levels of national reduction in 
2010 and 2025.  The results of this study are listed in Table 1.  Several other studies have 
estimated CO2 permit prices for the U.S.  The main findings of these studies are included 
in Table 2.  Moreover, observed prices in the European Climate Exchange, the first 
mandatory and geographically significant CO2 trading market have risen to about $30 
currently from about $9 upon the opening of the market in January 2005.  Sixty-five 
corporate entities are participants in the market, with many able to sell permits to third 
parties.   
 
 
Table 1.  Projected Carbon Emissions Marginal Abatement Costs for Selected 
Countries and Regions that have Ratified the Kyoto Protocol3
Projected Marginal 
Abatement cost per 













Canada 6% $26 $36 53.3 (25%)  177.8 (75%) 
Japan 6% $49 $43 70.1 (25%) 210.4 (75%)











                                                 
3 Energy Information Agency.  International Energy Outlook 2005.  “Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions.”  July 2005.  Available online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/.   
4 In percent and million metric tons. 
5 In percent and million metric tons. 
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Table 2.  Estimates of U.S. CO2 Permit Prices (2000 $) 
Organization Emissions Target Estimate of Permit Price (Year) 





Levels $23 (2008) $32 (2012) 
Energy Information 
Agency 
57 and 224 million 
metric tons by 2020 $50 (low estimate) $68 (high estimate) 
World Resources 
Institute 
7 percent below 
1990 Emissions 
Levels 
$30 (2010) $40 (2010) 
 
 
2.4  Calculating Shadow Prices 
 Several scholars have developed techniques, generally premised on linear 
programming or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) frameworks, to facilitate the 
calculation of shadow prices for effluents.  Färe et al. (1993) build a framework for 
deriving shadow prices for undesirable outputs in the pulp and paper industry.  The 
authors employ duality theory to determine producer-specific shadow prices, using a 
Shepard (1970) output distance function to define shadow prices for both good and bad 
outputs.  Their analysis demonstrates that shadow prices can effectively be calculated for 
non-marketable outputs and note that determining the shadow prices of undesirable 
outputs will verify whether or not emissions trading would be worthwhile.    Specifically, 
Färe et al. utilize a parametric linear programming approach to model the output distance 
function.  Comparing the output distance function with the revenue function yields the 
shadow price for each plant.  This shadow price represents the opportunity cost in lost 
electricity generation of reducing emissions by one ton.  As a result, lost income from 
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reduced electricity generation serves as a proxy for marginal abatement cost.  Ultimately, 
the authors suggest that if shadow prices equal marginal benefit to society of emission 
abatement, then regulations are leading to an efficient allocation of resources.  Moreover, 
“if the marginal benefit of emission control is equal for all firms, then efficient regulation 
would lead to equal shadow prices across firms.”  Hetemaki (1995) uses a parametric 
distance function to econometrically derive shadow prices.  Hailu and Veeman (2000) 
use a parametric distance function to generate efficiency measures and pollution 
abatement costs.  Following the framework laid out by Färe et al. (1993), they use this 
model to calculate shadow prices for the Canadian pulp and paper industry.   
 Other papers have used similar frameworks to characterize SO2 abatement costs 
for the electric utility industry.  Coggins and Swinton (1996) utilize the Färe et al. (1993) 
approach to calculate plant-specific SO2 shadow prices for a panel of Wisconsin coal-
burning power plants from 1990-1993.  The authors find an average shadow price of 
$292.70 per ton of SO2 for the panel, a price comparable to other shadow prices 
calculated for the Midwest, but still higher than allowances traded in the early years of 
the Acid Rain Program.  Swinton (1998) expands upon this analysis by including coal-
burning plants in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois, and by including abatement 
technology as an input.  He finds that before SO2 trading began marginal abatement costs 
varied widely across plants.  Moreover, he also finds that plants with the highest 
emissions rates also tend to have the lowest marginal abatement costs, perhaps explaining 
the lower-than-anticipated prices for emissions allowances.  Both of these studies utilize 
a parametric linear programming approach to model the output distance function 
described above.   
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 In a more recent analysis, Swinton (2002) calculated shadow prices for a panel of 
Florida plants from 1990-1998.  Again, the output distance function approach is used.  
Observed transaction decisions are used to calculate plant-specific cost savings of SO2 
trading.  In some cases, cost savings appear to be negative.  Yet Swinton finds that 
enough heterogeneity exists in the industry for allowance trading to yield costs savings 
for most plants, although he concludes that significant gains from trade have not 
materialized.   Färe et al. (2005) employ a quadratic directional output distance function 
to test the efficiency of electric utilities and to calculate shadow prices before and after 
Phase I of the Acid Rain Program.  This approach is used with the understanding that it 
has not been widely employed in other studies.  The authors find that reducing 
inefficiency within individual plants could reduce annual SO2 emissions by 4000-6000 
tons.  In addition, using the stochastic frontier method shadow SO2 prices are calculated 
at $76/ton in 1993 and $142/ton in 1997, values consistent with actual market prices.  
However, deterministic estimates of shadow prices are much higher, around $1100 in 
1993 and $1973 in 1997.  Thus, large gains in economic efficiency are possible through 
allowance trading, though these gains will diminish over time and become increasingly 
expensive as the output elasticity of substitution indicates that already efficient plants 
have fewer substitution options.  However, these results may be misleading since the 
authors do not estimate separate models based on abatement capital.   
 Rezek and Blair (2005) utilize the Färe et al. (1993) output distance function 
framework to calculate SO2 shadow prices for electric utility plants after Phase I of the 
Acid Rain Program.  Shadow prices are demonstrated to follow market outcomes, and the 
variance of abatement costs decreased over time, suggesting a substantial decrease in 
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abatement cost heterogeneity.  This finding is consistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis, where marginal abatement costs are equal if the market is working efficiently.  
In this study, the marginal abatement costs are not equal, but the decreasing variance over 
time suggests that they at least seem to be converging.   
 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) represents another approach to estimating 
efficiency.  DEA typically measures global efficiencies of production systems as revealed 
through cross-sectional data.  One advantage of DEA is that it is nonparametric, whereas 
other approaches impose a possibly restrictive functional form.  Moreover, DEA may 
easily measure multi-output production systems, though Park and Lesourd (2000) reveal 
that this is not a significant advantage over the duality approach followed in this paper.  
DEA is a common method for estimating plant efficiency in the electric utility industry.  
For instance, Pollitt (1996) examines an international sample of 78 nuclear power plants 
both publicly and privately owned.  Following the calculation of efficiency scores for 
each plant using DEA, Tobit/OLS analysis is used to test the null hypothesis that 
ownership has no effect on efficiency.  The results suggest that the 13 UK plants in the 
sample could stand to benefit at least marginally from lowered staffing levels.  
 Yaisawarng and Klein (1994) use DEA to develop a cumulative Malmquist input-
based productivity index for 61 coal-burning plants in the U.S. electric utility industry 
from 1985-5989.  They measure the efficiency of plants that must meet strict emissions 
standards while also satisfying electricity demand.  The Malmauist productivity change 
index is then broken down into changes in plant efficiency, changes in scale efficiency, 
and changes in technology.  The analysis accounts for the inclusion of undesirable inputs 
(sulfur) and undesirable outputs (SO2) in the process of producing a desirable output (net 
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generation) using conventional inputs (labor, capital, fuel).  Including desirable and 
undesirable inputs in the analysis credits each plant’s ability to choose the best means of 
meeting environmental control criteria.  This allows for an unbiased measure of 
productivity in an industry under environmental regulations.  Aiken and Pasurka (2003) 
use an output-based translog distance function to estimate shadow prices for PM-10 and 
SO2 emissions for 19 industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1970-1996.  
Similar to Yaisawarng and Klein (1994), these shadow prices may be used to adjust 
traditional total factor productivity growth indexes to account for the reallocation of 
inputs from the production of desirable outputs to pollution abatement activities.  This 
adjusted measure of total factor production reveals that adjusted productivity for several 
industries is actually much higher than the traditional measure of productivity.   
 Despite significant study of SO2 shadow prices, few scholars have ventured to 
estimate CO2 shadow prices.  Maradan and Vassiliev (2005) study how abatement costs 
vary through different stages of a country’s economic development.  CO2 shadow prices 
are calculated for 76 developing and developed countries, and abatement costs are 
deemed significantly higher for developing countries.  Given growing interest in a 
national CO2 trading market, the calculation of CO2 shadow prices in U.S. electric 
utilities will provide insight into the likely price range of CO2 allowances, as well as help 
identify what types of plants are more likely to buy or sell allowances in such a market.  
It is important to note that the U.S. electric utility industry is only a large subset of CO2 
emitters.  However, given the administrative difficulties associated with a comprehensive 
national carbon abatement strategy covering all sources as suggested by Kruger (2005), a 
CO2 trading market for electric utilities may offer a relatively easier mechanism for 
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quickly and substantially reducing domestic CO2 emissions.  That is, an allowance 
trading market might help pick the low-hanging fruit, buying more time to develop and 
implement more complicated domestic and international CO2 abatement strategies.      
 In this study, I follow the techniques employed by several previous studies, 
including Rezek and Blair (2005) and Färe et al. (1993), to calculate shadow prices for 
electric utility plants.  However, unlike these studies, this paper focuses on shadow prices 
for CO2.  The Färe et al. (1993) approach is chosen specifically for two several reasons.  
First, it has been used extensively and is commonly accepted and, second, logical 
constraints may be imposed upon shadow prices to more accurately reflect operating 
conditions within the electric utility industry.   
 
 
Section 3.  Model for Calculating Shadow Prices 
 
 Following the model described by Rezek and Blair (2005) and Färe et al. (1993), 
assume a given technology uses a set of  inputs to produce a set of  
outputs.  Let the output set, P(x), be a closed, bounded, and convex set describing all 
technically feasible output vectors.  A subset of these outputs, , will be defined as 
“goods,” while the remaining outputs, , will be defined as “bads.”  As Färe et al. 
(1993) suggest, a fundamental asymmetry exists between the good and bad outputs.  That 
is, goods may be rid of without cost, while bads may only be reduced by foregoing some 
beneficial output or increasing abatement inputs.  As an example, output set P(x), 








the feasible set.  The point on the horizontal axis directly below point A remains in the 
feasible set, so the good is freely disposable, yet the point on the vertical axis to the left 
of A is not included in the feasible output set, and so the bad is not freely disposable. 
 
Figure 2.  Output Distance Function6
 
 Shepard (1970) describes the technical relationship between inputs and outputs as 
a mapping of a multiple-output, multiple-input production process onto a real line.  The 
resulting line is the output distance function, Do (x, y), which measures the minimum 
scalar,θ , such that y /θ  is within the feasible set: 
 
(1) )}(/:min{),( xPyyxDo ∈= θθ  
 
The output distance function measures the maximum potential radial output expansion 
given observed inputs, shown as (OA/OA') in Figure 2.  The distance function is equal to 
one if and only if the observation is on the frontier of the output set P(x), while values 
less than one indicate the presence of inefficiency or production on the interior of P(x). 
                                                 
6 Rezek and Blair (2005), p. 329 
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 This paper bases the yardstick of efficiency on observed data and therefore 
ignores systematic inefficiency present in the electric utility industry.  The output 
distance function is a continuous function of x and y, is quasi-concave and nonincreasing 
in x, and exhibits homogeneity of degree 1 in y.  As in Rezek and Blair (2005), it is 
assumed to be nondecreasing in yd and nonincreasing in yu.  This implies that increased 
production of goods increases efficiency but increased production of bads reduces 
efficiency.  The output distance function is also compatible with weak output 
disposability, implying that a radial contraction of outputs is feasible with a given set of 
inputs, or if and )(xPy∈ ]1,0[∈θ , then y )(xP∈θ .  Because effluents may not be 
eliminated without reducing some desirable output or increasing abatement inputs, weak 
output disposability is a reasonable assumption in this context, making the output 
distance function intuitively appealing.    
 Shephard (1970) shows that the output distance function is dual to the revenue 
function under straightforward regularity conditions, implying 
 
(2)  }1),(:{sup),( ≤= yxDpypxR o
y
 




where p is the vector of output prices. Färe et al. (1993) solves the LaGrangian implied 
by Equation (2), yielding first-order conditions as given by 
 
(4) , ),(),( yxDpxRp ∇∗=
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where ∇  is the gradient operator. By applying the envelope theorem to the dual 
relationship given in Equation (3) and substituting the result into Equation (4), Färe et al. 
(1993) show that  
 
(5)   ),,(*),( yxpyxD =∇
 
where p* is defined as the revenue maximizing output price vector or the revenue-
deflated output shadow price. Therefore, the ratio of the derivatives of the distance 



















.   
 
Following Aigner and Chu's (1968) estimation procedure, restrictions can be placed on 
the signs of these derivatives to allow asymmetric treatment of desirable and undesirable 
outputs.  Shadow prices of goods and bads are restricted to be nonnegative and 
nonpositive, respectively, reflecting the assumptions that is nondecreasing in y),( yxDo d, 
and nonincreasing in yu. In the one-good, one-bad case, these restrictions act to impose a 
positive slope on the hyperplane tangent to the output set P(x) in the region under 
consideration. The slope of the hyperplane tangent to point A' in Figure 2 illustrates the 
left-hand side of Equation (6). 
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To compute the implicit price of the bad, I follow Färe et al. (1993) and Rezek and Blair 
(2005) in assuming that the shadow price of the desirable output equals its observed 
price.  As Rezek and Blair (p. 330) go on to state,  
“In the context of the output distance function, with its dual relationship to the 
revenue function, these shadow prices represent the marginal revenue associated 
with an additional unit of abatement.  The shadow prices of bads are reflective of 
the marginal rate of transformation between the desirable and undesirable outputs 
and, as such, represent the value of the electricity that is foregone when emissions 
are reduced.” 
 
As noted above, several previous studies employ this method to restrict effluent shadow 
prices in the context of electricity production (Coggins and Swinton, 1996; Swinton, 
1998, 2002) and pulp and paper production (Färe et al., 1993; Hailu and Veeman, 2000). 
In this paper the output distance function is calculated by the translog 









































































where theα ii, β j, and γ ij are unknown parameters to be estimated.  The Färe et al. 
(1993) framework uses linear programming to solve for the combination of parameters 
that yields the best-fit distance function given the observed input and output data. The 
theoretical properties of the output distance function and the assumptions of the model 
are incorporated into the linear program as constraints.  As Färe et al. (1993) explain, this 
functional form is flexible and does not impose strong disposability on outputs, making 
this form particularly useful when calculating a shadow price.  Thus, the following linear 










(10)   k = 1, … , K 0),(ln ≤kk yxD
(11)  k = 1, … , K 0ln/),(ln ≥∂∂ kd
kk yyxD
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(12)  k = 1, … , K 0ln/),(ln ≤∂∂ ku
kk yyxD
(13)  k = 1, … , K 0ln/),(ln ≤∂∂ kkk xyxD
(14a)  ∑ =
i
i 1α
(14b)   = 1, … , M ∑ =′
i
ii 0α i′
(14c)  j = 1, … , N ∑ =
i
ij 0γ
(15a) iiii ′′ = αα  i = 1, … , M, i′  = 1, … M 
(15b) iiii ′′ = ββ  i = 1, … , M, i′  = 1, … M 
 
where the sample consists of K observations.  As prescribed by Rezek and Blair (2005), 
Equation (10) requires that each observation remain in the feasible set. Equations (11) 
and (12) correspond to the assumptions of nonnegative and nonpositive shadow prices for 
the desirable and undesirable outputs, respectively. Equation (13) requires that the output 
distance function be nonincreasing in inputs. Equations (14a)-(14c) require the distance 
function to be homogeneous of degree one in outputs. Finally, Equations (15a) and (15b) 
impose symmetry on the interaction parameters of the translog functional form. These 
restrictions reflect the assumptions made previously regarding the properties of the output 
distance function and allow for the calculation of efficiency measures and the 
computation of the accompanying shadow prices. 
In order to calculate shadow prices for each observation, this paper expounds 
upon Rezek and Blair’s Equation (7) such that derivatives from the log distance function 
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can be used to calculate shadow prices.  Beginning with Equation (7), the end result was 
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Section 4.  Data  
 
 The computation of CO2 shadow prices is based on a sample of 518 electric 
power plants (note: the sample includes both utilities and non-utilities) that emit CO2 in 
the year 2000.  Plants producing solely from nuclear, wind, hydro, etc., or a combination 
of the above were thus excluded from the analysis.  Data were obtained from a number of 
sources containing both plant level (EPA eGrid 2000, EIA 2000 Form 423, and FERC 
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Form 1) and utility level (EIA 2000 Form 861) data.  Altogether, the plants included in 
this study accounted for 1,953 millions tons or approximately 83% of total CO2 
emissions from the electric utility industry in 2000 (EIA 2000).7
 Data on net electricity generation from fossil fuel sources only, total annual CO2 
emissions, and nameplate capacity, or the maximum available generation capability, were 
obtained from the EPA eGrid 2000 Database.  In this study, nameplate capacity is used as 
a proxy for capital (see Nemoto and Goto, 2003; Pollitt, 1996; Färe et al., 2005; Rezek 
and Blair, 2005; etc.).  Data on average heat content of fuels purchased were gathered 
from EIA Form 423, and data on fuel consumption were taken from EIA Form 759.  The 
average number of employees, the measure of labor input, were obtained from FERC 
Form 1 2000 and 2001 data along with EIA Form 412 2001 data.  Data from a consistent 
year, particularly 2000, would have been preferred but proved difficult to obtain.  
Nevertheless, the average number of employees is assumed to remain fairly consistent 
between years, and so the inclusion of 2001 data for some plants is not expected to 
significantly alter the results.  In addition, utilities reporting no employee number for any 
plant in FERC Form 1 were excluded form the analysis under the assumption that the 
“zeros” listed were not actual employee numbers.  Likewise, cases where all plants for a 
given utility have zero employees listed in EIA Form 412 were also excluded.  It is 
assumed that these reports are not accurate.   
Rezek and Blair (2005) calculate a proxy for electricity price using revenue 
earned by the utility from the sale of electricity divided by net electricity generated.  This 
calculation, however, does not account for instances where a plant purchases electricity 
from another plant to sell to its own customers.  To compensate for this, in this study the 
                                                 
7 http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/gg01rpt/carbon.html  
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price of electricity generated at each plant, based on EIA Form 861, was assumed to be 
equal to average revenue from all electricity sales divided by total electricity dispatched. 
Specifically, a per unit “price” of electricity was calculated as resale and retail revenue 
divided by total electricity dispatched, where resale revenue is defined as revenue 
received for the sale of wholesale power to other electric utilities, for resale to others, 
either electric utilities or retail consumers; and retail revenue is defined as revenue 
received for the direct sale of energy to retail customers (this entry does not include 
revenue for retail delivery services provided to customers who selected other energy 
suppliers, as in “retail wheeling” programs in deregulated markets). Because revenue data 
is only available at the utility level, it is assumed that each plant owned by a given utility 
has the same price.  The weighted average price of electricity in this study is 5.28 cents 
per kilowatt hour, a figure slightly lower than the average revenue per kilowatt hour for 
all fuel types observed in 2000 of 6.68 cents per kilowatt hour.  Given that this paper only 
includes facilities burning fossil fuels, which generally offer lower production costs, this 
proxy appears reliable.   
Plants are grouped according to fuel usage: coal and gas; coal and oil, no gas; and 
gas, no coal.  Because of the use of different technologies between these groups, the 
distance function may not yield accurate estimates when based on an estimated model 
using the entire sample.  Thus, the distance function is calculated separately for each 
group to measure efficiency only between plants using similar fuel technology.  The 




Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics 
 All Groups Group 1 Coal and Gas 
Group 2 
Coal and Oil, 
no Gas 
Group 3 
Gas, no Coal 




















































































Standard Deviation in parentheses. 
 
 
Section 5.  Results 
 
 Using the framework described in Section 3, the unknown parameters for the 
output distance function given in Equation (8) are estimated and integrated with the input 
and output data to yield plant-specific distance function values and shadow prices.  
Premium Solver Platform 7 for Excel by Frontline System, Inc. is used to solve the linear 
program.  The average output distance function value for each group is listed in Table 4.  
Overall, technical efficiency ranges from 0.03 to 1, indicating wide variation in 
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efficiency.  The mean indicates that, on average, plants are about 64 percent efficient.  
Studies of U.S. plants with regard to SO2 emissions find relatively higher levels of 
efficiency.  Rezek and Blair (2005) report 83.5 percent efficiency, Coggins and Swinton 
(1996) report 94.6 percent efficiency, and Färe et al. (2005) report 80.4 percent 
efficiency.  Note that these estimations are for U.S. electric power plants under the 
mandatory Acid Rain Program.  Because U.S. electric power plants may not necessarily 
be trying to be efficient with regard to CO2 emissions, this could explain why estimated 
efficiencies from this model are relatively low.  The efficiency results suggest that plants 
could enjoy significant cost savings, in lieu of a CO2 market, by altering its operations.    
 
Table 4.  Efficiency (D0) 
 Total Group 1 Coal and Gas 
Group 2 
Coal and Oil, 
no Gas 
Group 3 
Gas, no Coal 
Mean 0.64 0.64 0.75 0.54 
Minimum 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.03 
Maximum 1 1 1 1 
Std. Deviation 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.21 
 
  
Using Equation (18) shadow prices are computed for each plant.  The average 
shadow prices for each group are reported in Table 5.  Including plants from all groups, 




Table 5.  CO2 Shadow Price Calculations ($/ton) 
 All Groups Group 1 Coal and Gas 
Group 2 
Coal and Oil, 
no Gas 
Group 3 
Gas, no Coal 
Mean 39.97 53.95 50.67 20.09 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 467.97 388.42 467.97 343.05 
Std. Deviation 55.58 48.85 66.84 39.87 
 
 
 For some plants the estimated shadow price was infinite.  This was the case with 
one plant in Group 1, one plant in Group 2, and one plant in Group 3.  In these cases the 
constraint that the derivative of the translog distance function with respect to the log of 
net generation was zero or near zero.  To compute estimated averages that are a better 
representation of the true average, the shadow prices for these plants were assumed to be 
equal to the highest finite price in the group.  Keeping the infinite prices in the model 
would distort the reported mean and decrease the usefulness of this model, and removing 
them was deemed inappropriate.  Thus, by keeping these values relatively high, they still 
are significant within the model but do not distort it beyond usability.  Ultimately, 
estimates of CO2 market prices are not affected by this assumption, as the infinite costs 
would only come into play under an implausible scenario whereby industry emissions are 
driven to zero.   
 Based on these results, this paper discusses several implications for a CO2 trading 
permit program in the U.S. electric utility industry.  First, these shadow prices may be 
used to construct an industry marginal abatement cost curve.  Calculating the relevant 
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area under the curve suggests how much given levels of CO2 abatement will cost.  
Second, the variation in shadow prices between groups provides insight into what types 
of plants would seek to purchase or sell permits; that is, how different types of plants 
would be affected by a permit trading program.  In addition, marginal abatement cost 
curves can be constructed for each group.  Finally, given targeted CO2 emissions 
reductions levels, the increased cost of electricity production from fossil fuels due to 
marginal abatement costs allows for comparison with different types of non-CO2 emitting 
fuels (i.e. nuclear and hydroelectric) to determine if they are a cost-effective alternative 
given the higher costs stemming from a CO2 permit market to reduce CO2 emissions.   
 
5.1  CO2 Marginal Abatement Costs in the U.S. Electric Utility Industry  
 The calculation of shadow prices allows for the estimation of a lower-bound 
industry marginal control cost curve.  Under the assumption that plant-specific marginal 
costs are equal to the shadow price across all levels of abatement, the costs of reducing 
given levels of CO2 may be obtained.  To illustrate this concept, assume the lowest 
shadow price was $0.50 and this plant generates 1,000 tons.  The cost for controlling each 
ton up to 1000 would be $0.50 per ton. If the next lowest shadow price was $1 and this 
plant generates 500 tons, the industry marginal cost for each of the next 500 tons would 
be $1, and so on.  Because plant marginal abatement costs are assumed to be constant, the 
curve represents a lower bound industry MAC curve.  It is likely that plant marginal 
abatement costs are increasing, particularly for high levels of abatement.  The lower-
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 In order to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. would be expected to reduce 
CO2 emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels.  Table 6 lists the levels of CO2 emissions 
for 1990 and 2000 for the U.S. and Table 7 lists the levels of CO2 emissions specific to 







Table 6.  U.S. Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Emissions8
Total National CO2 Emissions (Million Metric Tons) 
Estimated 2000 Emissions  5,806.1 
Change Compared to 1999  174.8 
Change from 1999 (percent) 3.1% 
Estimated 1990 Emissions  4969.9 
Change Compared to 1990  836.2 
Change from 1990 (percent)  16.8% 
Average Annual Increase, 1990-2000 (percent) 1.6% 
7 Percent Below 1990 Emissions 4622.01 
Required Reduction from 2000 National Emissions to 
Meet Kyoto National Target  1184.09 
Required Percent Reduction from 2000 National 










                                                 
8 Adapted from Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the United States 2000: Carbon Dioxide.  EIA.  2002.  
Available online at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/gg01rpt/carbon.html.   
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Table 7.  Electric Utility Industry Carbon Dioxide Emissions9
Total Electric Utility Industry CO2 Emissions 
Electric Utility Industry 2000 Emissions (million 
metric tons) 2,252.1 
Electric Utility Industry 1990 Emissions (million 
metric tons) 1,790.3 
Industry Change Compared to 1990 (million metric 
tons) 461.8 
Change from 1990 (percent) 25.8% 
7 Percent Below 1990 Industry Emissions 1664.98 
Required Reduction from 2000 Industry Emissions to 
Meet Proportional Kyoto Target (million metric tons) 587.12 
Required Percent Reduction from 2000 Industry 
Emissions to Meet Proportional Kyoto Target  26.1% 
 
 Because the electric utility industry is responsible for 39 percent of CO2 emissions 
in 2000, making it the largest single source of CO2, it is likely that any reduction program 
would require the industry to reduce emissions beyond its proportional share of total 
emissions.  That is, given the relatively small number of emissions sources, it would be 
much easier to regulate the electric utility industry than the transportation sector, the next 
largest contributor of domestic CO2 emissions at 33 percent (EIA 2005).  Thus, for 
example, under the rubric of the Kyoto Protocol, the industry would likely be responsible 
for reducing somewhere between 587.12 million metric tons (7 percent below the 
industry’s 1990 emissions levels) and 1,184.09 million metric tons (7 percent below 
                                                 
9 Adapted from EPA Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990-2003, Chapter 3: 
Energy.  EPA.  2005.  Available online at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/RAMR69V4ZT/$File/05energy.pdf.   
 
 35
national 1990 emissions levels).   Subsequently, this paper presents two major scenarios 
of reduction targets to predict industry marginal abatement costs and, hence, the market 
permit price for one ton of CO2.  The first scenario, labeled the “Kyoto Protocol 
Scenario” (KPS), entails meeting the Kyoto target of 7 percent below 1990 emissions 
levels.  The second scenario, labeled the “1990 Level Scenario” (1990S), entails reducing 
2000 emissions to 1990 levels, a proposal made by several in Washington, DC. Further, 
the following analysis presents upper bound (UB) and lower bound (LB) CO2 permit 
price estimates under the two scenarios.  The upper bound estimation assumes that the 
electric utility industry will be the sole sector responsible for meeting emissions targets 
under both scenarios.  The lower bound estimation assumes that the electric utility 
industry will only be responsible for reducing its proportional share of national emissions 
and not compensating for any other sectors to meet the targets of both scenarios.  The 
actual industry target for any CO2 abatement program would likely fall between these 
bounds, as the electric utility industry would likely object to bearing the full burden of 
abatement while the relatively small number of emissions sources reduce the 
administration and compliance costs of an abatement program.  As a result, the upper and 
lower bounds presented in this analysis are merely suggested reference points given 










Table 8.  Upper and Lower Bound Estimates of a Permit Price under the Kyoto 
Protocol Scenario (KPS) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Total Reduction (million 
metric tons) 587.12 1184.09 
Estimated Permit Price 
($/ton) 30.70 48.48 
Total Abatement Cost  $10,930,957,788 $34,275,114,659 
 
 
Table 9.  Upper and Lower Bound Estimates of a Permit Price under the 1990 Level 
Scenario (1990S) 
 Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Total Reduction (million 
metric tons) 461.8 836.2 
Estimated Permit Price 
($/ton) 27.00 37.40 
Total Abatement Cost  $7,281,583,636 $18,735,865,331 
 
 
Thus, if a domestic permit program were implemented to comply with the Kyoto target, 
the likely resulting permit price would lie somewhere between $30.70/ton and 
$48.48/ton.  Table 10 presents estimates of permit price and total average cost for 
increments between these bounds.  These values, including those estimated for the two 














Cost (TAC)  
500 22.2% 27.90 $8,429,311,089 
600 26.6% 30.80 $11,077,165,127 
700 31.1% 32.90 $14,118,104,555 
800 35.5% 35.80 $17,554,110,196 
900 40.0% 39.50 $21,979,919,622 
1,000 44.4% 42.10 $25,174,073,027 
1,100 48.8% 46.60 $30,282,864,559 
 
 
5.2  Behavioral Response to a CO2 Permit Trading Program by Group 
 The average CO2 shadow price among all plants is $39.97/ton.  However, the 
shadow prices do differ between the three groups.  Group 1 (coal and gas) plants have an 
average shadow price of $53.95/ton, Group 2 (coal and oil, no gas) plants have an 
average price of $50.67/ton, and Group 3 (gas, no coal) averages $20.09/ton.  This 
suggests that, on average, plants burning natural gas face significantly smaller costs in 
reducing CO2 emissions on the margin.  If a CO2 permit trading program were 
established, Group 3 plants would likely benefit from the sale of permits, as many firms 
could substantially reduce CO2 emissions for less than the market price of a permit.  
However, a comparison of all three groups’ marginal abatement cost curves, depicted in 
Figure 4, reveals an important caveat.   
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As Table 11 illustrates below, Group 3 plants make up only 15.38 percent of net 
generation and account for only 9.99% of total emissions in the sample.  This implies that 
as the abatement increases, the percent of total production affected by abatement 
strategies rises disproportionately for Group 3 plants relative to the other groups.  
Ultimately, as the number of tons to be reduced approaches 200 million, further reduction 











Table 11.  Percentage of Net Generation in Sample and CO2 Emissions by Group 
Group Net Generation (MWh) 





Percent of CO2 
Emissions in 
Sample 
Group 1: Coal 
and Gas 500,718,015 26.33% 558,205,007.5 28.58% 
Group 2: Coal 
and Oil, no Gas 1,108,411,211 58.29% 1,199,805,908 61.43% 
Group 3: Gas, 
no Coal 292,411,942 15.38% 195,257,205.8 9.99% 
Total 1,901,541,169 100% 1,953,268,122 100% 
 
 
The share of total emissions and net generation suggests that the total abatement quantity 
may influence group behavior under a tradable permit program.  Because all three groups 
would share in the reduction effort, no one group would be in danger of approaching its 
limit.  Thus, Group 3 plants, with a lower average shadow price, are likely to sell permits 
to Groups 1 and 2, both with significantly higher average shadow prices.  Furthermore, 
the EPA reports that coal contains the highest amount of carbon per unit of energy, while 
petroleum has about 25 percent less carbon than coal, and natural gas about 45 percent 
less (EPA 2001).  Where possible, some plants might switch from coal or petroleum to 
burn natural gas.  This could dramatically reduce a plant’s CO2 emissions, though the 
cost would vary depending on new levels of demand for natural gas.  Thus, a plant-
specific study accounting for each plant’s ability to switch fuels and estimate natural gas 
prices based on market conditions would prove valuable in determining how significant 
fuel switching can be in CO2 reductions.  Ultimately, though, the results of this paper 
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indicate that Group 3 plants stand to benefit the most from a tradable permit program 
while Group 1 and 2 plants may be at a relative disadvantage. 
 
5.3  Influence of Marginal Abatement Costs on  Fuel Choice 
 Given the increased cost in generation from an abatement level, fossil fuel 
technologies may be compared with non-greenhouse gas emitting technologies to 
compare for cost-effectiveness in achieving the targeted CO2 emissions reduction.  
Specifically, dividing total abatement cost by total net electricity generation yields the 
cost of abatement in dollar per kilowatt terms.  To obtain specific costs for coal and 
natural gas, this is done using estimates for Group 2 and 3 plants, respectively. These 
abatement costs can then be added to current levelized costs of fossil fuel electricity 
generation to estimate new levelized fuel costs under a CO2 trading program with a 
targeted level of emissions.  A levelized electricity generation cost is estimated as a 
function of capital cost, fuel cost, operation and maintenance costs, and other costs over 
the lifetime of a power plant, usually 30 years.  Levelized costs by fuel technology were 
obtained from the 1996 Energy Technology Status Report published by the California 
Energy Commission and are reported in Table 12.  Note that these figures are adjusted 
from 1993 constant dollars to 2000 dollars using CPI.  Increased cost from given levels of 





Table 12.  Levelized Cost of Electricity Generation Technologies10
Fuel Type Levelized Cost Per Kilowatt Hour (cents/kWh adjusted for 2000 $) 
Natural Gas (conventional combined cycle) 4.14-4.62 
Coal (pulverized) 4.02-4.62 
Nuclear (pressurized water reactor) 6.63-9.23 
Geothermal (vapor-dominated resource) 4.26-7.56 
Hydroelectric (conventional) 3.24-6.63 
Biomass (direct combustion) 6.15-11.72 
Municipal Solid Waste (mass burn) 1.76-4.02 
Wind (utility scale) 4.02 











                                                 
10 Adapted from 1996 Energy Technology Status Report.  California Energy Commission.  Dec. 1997.  
Costs are “levelized over a typical lifetime (30 years) beginning in 2000.”  All costs are for publicly owned 
utilities and are adjusted from 1993 constant dollars to 2000 dollars using CPI.  Report available online at: 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/etsr/9704ETSR.PDF.   
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Table 13.  Increased Cost for Given Levels of Abatement (Cents/kWh)  












461.8 (1990S, LB) 0.21 4.23 0.58 4.72 
500 0.25 4.27 0.64 4.78 
587.12 (KPS, LB) 0.36 4.38 0.69 4.83 
600 0.38 4.40 0.69 4.83 
700 0.50 4.52 0.72 4.86 
800 0.64 4.66 0.73 4.87 
836.2 (1990S, UB) 0.73 4.75 0.76 4.90 
900 0.89 4.91 0.81 4.95 
1,000 1.10 5.12 0.82 4.96 
1,100 1.28 5.30 0.86 5.00 
1184.09 (KPS, 
UB) 1.54 5.56 0.98 5.12 
 
 
Both the baseline and new levelized costs for coal (Figure 3) and natural gas 
(Figure 4) are compared with currently available fuel technologies at various abatement 
targets.  In both cases, coal and natural gas remain competitive at relatively low levels of 
abatement.  Assuming that each technology is pursed with the greatest possible 
efficiency, the lower bound estimates of levelized costs for each fuel type listed in Table 
12 are used in Figures 5 and 6.  Comparing levelized costs of coal and natural gas at 
increasing increments of abatement reveals that some options such as hydroelectric, 
wind, and geothermal may present cost-effective alternatives to fossil fuels under a CO2 
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reduction program.  Despite its low levelized cost, municipal solid waste involves 
combustion, thus releasing CO2, and therefore may not be a preferable alternative.  
Ultimately, these findings reveal that pursing non-CO2 emitting energy technologies will 
likely be a part of a cost-effective CO2 mitigation strategy.  
 








































































































































































































































Figure 7 compares increased levelized costs of producing coal and natural gas at 
increasing levels of CO2 abatement.  For lower levels of abatement, coal remains cheaper 
per kWh than natural gas.  However, for extremely high levels of abatement, particularly 
as the abatement target approaches the upper bound of Scenario 1, natural gas proves to 
be cheaper per kWh.  Note that since 2000 natural gas fuel prices have increased 
dramatically, so these results may be different provided more current data.  Nevertheless, 
these results suggest that coal remains a viable energy source compared to natural gas for 
low to moderate levels of CO2 abatement despite the significant difference in shadow 
prices between Groups 2 and 3. 
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Section 6.  Conclusions 
 
 In contrast to SO2, CO2 is a globally mixing gas.  Whereas domestic efforts to 
reduce SO2 emissions can have a substantial impact on air quality, domestic efforts to 
reduce CO2 emissions will alone not be enough to substantially influence global climate 
change.  Thus, a global CO2 permit trading market is the optimal policy instrument to 
curb global climate change, not a national or regional effort.  Comparing the shadow 
prices estimated by this paper with the predicted MAC per ton of CO2 for Canada, Japan, 
and Western Europe (though for the year 2010) from the EIA International Energy 
Outlook 2005 (Table 1), it appears the U.S. would likely fall somewhere in between 
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Canada and Western Europe.  Still, even in an international market, transactions occur 
between permit holders and not between countries.  Thus, any study attempting to 
analyze an international CO2permit market must obtain international data on individual 
power plants.  This data is available, though it usually must be obtained through private 
companies and is typically quite expensive.  Nevertheless, should the U.S. choose to 
participate in such an international market, an understanding of the marginal abatement 
cost structures of U.S. electric power plants provides considerable insight into how this 
market will affect these firms.  Moreover, there are sure to be real concerns regarding the 
national cost of participating in such a program, inviting further discussion on the most 
cost-effective means of achieving the stated emissions target.   
 Using a parametric distance function approach, this paper found an average 
shadow price of 39.97 $/ton for the U.S. electric utility industry, a figure consistent with 
other calculations of CO2 shadow prices.  These shadow prices were used to construct 
industry and technology-specific marginal abatement cost curves to determine the costs 
associated with varying levels of CO2 reductions.  In particular, two potential scenarios 
were studied.  One scenario estimated permit prices and total abatement cost of following 
the Kyoto Protocol and reducing national CO2 emissions to 7 percent below 1990 levels.  
The other estimated a permit price and total abatement cost of reducing national CO2 
emissions to 1990 levels.  Under each scenario, an upper bound estimate was generated 
under the assumption that the electric utility industry would be the sole sector responsible 
for meeting the targeted reduction.  A lower bound estimate was then generated under the 
assumption that the industry would only be responsible for reducing its proportional share 
of total CO2 emissions.  It is likely that any effort to reduce domestic CO2 emissions 
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would call on the electric utility industry to fall somewhere in between these estimates.  
Under the Kyoto scenario, a permit price is estimated to be between 30.70 and 48.48 
$/ton with a total cost between $10.93 billion and $34.28 billion.  Under the 1990 level 
scenario, a permit price is estimated to be between 27.00 and 37.40 $/ton with a total cost 
between $7.28 billion and $18.74 billion.  Incremental permit prices and total average 
costs were subsequently estimated between these values. 
Behavioral responses of different types of plants were also considered given 
varying shadow prices between technological groups.  The results reveal that plants 
employing mostly natural gas generating units will likely benefit the most from a permit 
trading program, or at least would incur the least costs, as they have significantly lower 
abatement costs than plants that primarily rely on coal or rely on both coal and natural 
gas.  This is likely a result of the fuel since natural gas contains about 45 percent less 
carbon per unit of energy than coal.  Also, coal and natural gas appear to have similar 
input costs per unit of electricity.  Thus, fuel switching could prove to be a significant 
component of a CO2 emissions reduction strategy.  Further research may provide 
valuable insight into how large of a role fuel switching may play in meeting CO2 
emissions reductions targets, particularly since natural gas prices have increased 
substantially since 2000.     
Indeed, given the relatively small number of studies focusing on CO2 shadow 
prices, benefits from further research may potentially be substantial.  For example, with 
Group 3 plants only composing a small portion of overall net generation and CO2 
emissions, and with this group being most likely to sell permits to plants in other groups, 
the overall impact that Group 3 permits could have on the overall market is not well 
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understood.  In addition, the marginal abatement costs curves constructed for this paper 
only offer a lower bound estimate.  A more exact industry cost curve would provide more 
precise information on potential costs faced by the electric utility industry when reducing 
CO2 emissions by a given quantity.  Furthermore, this would also allow for a more 
accurate assessment of cost-effectiveness by fuel type to meet emissions targets.   
Finally, the total costs of implementing a CO2 permit trading program were 
factored into current electricity fossil fuel prices by type and compared with prices of 
other fuel types, allowing for a comparison of cost-effectiveness in meeting prescribed 
emissions reduction targets.  For lower levels of abatement between the lower and upper 
bounds of both scenarios, the price of fossil fuel energy is relatively competitive.  
However, higher levels of abatement suggest that alternative non-emitting energy sources 
may provide significant cost relief in meeting emissions reduction targets.  Still, the exact 
role alternative energy sources will play in reducing CO2 emissions is beyond the scope 
of this paper, but the results suggest there is likely a role to play.   
In estimating CO2 shadow prices for electric power plants in the U.S., this paper 
lends insight into how a CO2 permit trading market might take shape in the U.S. and how 
much total abatement will cost, and suggests that alternative energy sources can likely 
reduce the overall costs of a large-scale abatement strategy.  Specifically, the estimated 
shadow price for each plant allows for the estimation of total costs, prediction of plant 
behavior under a CO2 market, and comparison with other energy sources for a test of 
cost-effectiveness.  Given a relatively small number of studies on CO2 shadow prices, 
this paper provides a good first step in exploring the areas discussed.  However, as 
mentioned above, further research on this hot topic, extending this analysis, will better 
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enhance the development of a sound national, and perhaps international CO2 abatement 
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